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In July 1945, the U.S. government’s “ProjectTrinity” culminated in the detonation of thefirst nuclear device over the New Mexico
desert. The following month, when the first
nuclear bomb was exploded over Hiroshima,
Japan, it seemed that no more lethal weapon could
be conceived of or employed by humankind.  But
little more than a few decades later, J. Robert
Oppenheimer’s famous, fearful comment about
that first product of Trinity—”I am become death,
the destroyer of worlds”—holds true for the tri-
umvirate of deadly weapons that are the descen-
dants of that first foray into mass destruction.  In
addition to nuclear weapons, our arsenal of whole-
sale annihilation now also includes chemical
weapons and—perhaps most sinister and threaten-
ing of all—biological weapons. 
There are many reasons that biological weapons
are, to many, the most threatening of all weapons
of mass destruction:
• Biological agents are easy—and often 
inexpensive—to produce from existing 
pharmaceutical products.
• Any country with a reasonably sophisticat-
ed pharmaceutical industry has the ability 
to produce them.
• It is relatively easy to hide bioweapon 
facilities within legitimate biotechnology 
sites, compared to chemical and nuclear 
weapons.
• International laws against developing 
biological weapons are hindered by a lack 
of verification and inspection.
Add to all that the lethality and death on a massive
scale that could be caused by biological agents—it
is estimated that one gram of the right toxin could
kill 10 million people—and the world is faced with
a threat potentially as troubling as the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. It is for all those reasons that
biological weapons are often referred to as the
“poor man’s atomic bomb.”
“Historically, there has been a close connection
between the dominant technologies of an age and
the forms of warfare and other social violence in
which it engages,” states the recent report, Averting
the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology and the
Proliferation of Biological and Chemical Weapons,
published by the Harvard/Sussex Project of
Harvard University and the University of Sussex,
both grantees of Carnegie Corporation.
“All major technologies—metallurgy, explosives,
internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear
energy—have been extensively exploited, not only
for peaceful purposes, but also for hostile ones,”
the report continues. “If this pattern is allowed to
be repeated for biotechnology—certain to be a
dominant technology of this new century—the
nature of the weapon and the contexts in which it
is employed would be dramatically changed.”
And from all indications, that change is under-
way—and is swifter and more dramatic than any-
one would have imagined.* Adding to the pressures 
* The facts and status of issues discussed in this paper are current and correct as of the date of
the paper’s publication.  However, because this is a field in which events do take place at a
rapid pace, it is possible that some circumstances may have changed at the time this report is
being read.
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on this volatile situation is the continuing scientific
exploration of the human genome: there is no
doubt that the medical, social, economic and scien-
tific benefits beginning to flow from our under-
standing of human genetic structure will ensure
that continued knowledge of biological agents, for
good or ill, will continue to spread throughout the
world. 
Still, the threat of biological weapons seems to be
one of the world’s best kept, if not most dangerous
secrets, focused on by a relatively small internation-
al policy and academic community.  These groups
are working to ensure that procedures are put in
place so that biotechnological products and
processes are used for peaceful and productive pur-
poses and not as weapons of mass destruction. In
the coming months, many of these agencies and
organizations will be part of a major effort to
enhance the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, the 30-year-old treaty that was
designed to curb the development of biological
weapons. It has not really served its purpose,
though, because it contains no real means of either
enforcing its provisions or of punishing nations
that illegally engage in biological weapons develop-
ment. The international community is attempting
to rectify that flaw by supporting a series of meas-
ures designed to add enforcement teeth to the
treaty—primarily through inspections of facilities
suspected of producing biological weapons.  
However, there are serious concerns among analysts
and scholars that years of political wrangling over
what shape and form enforcement should take
have resulted in too many compromises. The fear
is that a series of watered-down enforcement meas-
ures could do more harm than good by leading the
world to think that the problem is being dealt with
and that biological weapons are being contained. 
“The stakes are too high because if we put some-
thing in place and it doesn’t perform as advertised,
we’ll put false promises in place,” says Amy
Smithson, senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson
Center in Washington, D.C., a long-time Carnegie
Corporation grantee working on issues relating to
weapons of mass destruction.
Scholars and policymakers may be wary of the
process aimed at developing a workable, effective
means of verifying that nations comply with the
biological weapons treaty, but there are also other
forces that come into play around the negotiations.
A major impediment, for example, is the pharma-
ceutical industry, which is concerned about pro-
posed inspections because it fears losing biological
secrets potentially worth billions of dollars.
Echoing similar sentiments, the U.S. government
believes that the country’s advanced pharmaceutical
industry will be left open to industrial espionage if
inspections are not strictly controlled. 
But if there is one thing that everyone seems to
agree upon, it is the unquestionable need to con-
trol biological weapons, one of the most serious
threats ever to face humanity.
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DEFINING THE DEBATE. One fact that must
be confronted at the beginning of any discussion of
weapons of mass destruction is this: more countries
possess biological (and chemical) weapons than
possess nuclear weapons. And while nuclear and
chemical weapons have relatively strong regulations
governing their production and stockpiling, biolog-
ical weapons have none.  None.
Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
of 1993—which banned the production of chemi-
cal weapons and approved procedures to inspect
suspected chemical weapon production facilities—
the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention has no organization, no budget and no
inspection provisions, merely a pledge by the signa-
tories “never in any circumstances to develop, pro-
duce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” bio-
logical agents or toxins that have no preventative,
protective or peaceful purposes. (See Appendix—
History of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention.)
That’s not to say that the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention doesn’t serve an important
purpose. It does, by creating a clear standard
against the development of biological and toxin
weapons. A total of 143 countries have agreed to
that standard by signing the convention.
However, the effectiveness of the treaty as a tool to
inhibit development of biological weapons is hin-
dered by the lack of inspections and other means
of determining that nations are complying with its
provisions. For the purposes of negotiation, these
verification tools are known jointly as the
“Verification Protocol.” It is hoped that ratification
of the Verification Protocol will be enough of a
deterrent that any nation valuing its standing in
the world will refrain from developing a biological
weapons program sure to alienate it from an inter-
national community striving to find cooperative
ways to ensure productive and peaceful global
development.
One factor blurring both national and internation-
al focus on the need to create a strong, effective
and enforceable biological weapons treaty is that so
much governmental and public attention—particu-
larly in the U.S.—is fixed on preparing  for a bio-
logical weapons attack rather than preventing one.
This may be an understandable reaction.  Terrorists
have attacked in Europe and the Middle East as
well as in the U.S., at the World Trade Center in
New York City and the Federal Building in
Oklahoma City.  But it is as if the world believes
that it is impossible to prevent such attacks, so the
best thing to do is to prepare for the clean-up in
the aftermath.
To observers, that’s a very dangerous stance.   
“Clearly in this age of terrorism, the threat posed
by biological weaponry becomes even more fright-
ening, and it is incumbent on American leadership
to move now to curb the production and deploy-
ment of microorganisms that can cause specific dis-
eases in humans and animals and plants,” says for-
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mer Senator Sam Nunn, a trustee of Carnegie
Corporation of New York.  
STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL AND
TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION. The world
is not completely bereft of safeguards against bio-
logical weapons. As mentioned, some nations are
preparing themselves for both civil and military
responses to an attack. At the same time, they’re
attempting to restrict exports of materials and 
technologies that can be used for production of
biological weapons, as well as dual-use equipment,
which is commercially available hardware and tech-
nology that can be employed for both legitimate
commercial and scientific purposes as well as for
weapons production. 
And, of course, there is a long-standing, wide-
spread moral repugnance on the part of most
nations and their people against the use of biologi-
cal weapons on the grounds that they are cruel and
inhuman.  But that said, the century just passed
witnessed numerous uses of such weapons, from
poison gas deployed on European battlefields dur-
ing World War I to the lethal gassing of Kurdish
people in Iraq in the 1990s.
Still, the world community seems to be in agree-
ment that some type of enforceable measures must
be put in place to prevent future uses of such
weapons. The major action now being negotiated
to control biological weapons is something like the
enforcement measures contained within the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This
treaty includes provisions for verified declaration
and destruction of existing chemical weapons, and
for international coordination and cooperation to
discourage, detect and punish any future develop-
ment, possession, transfer or use of such weapons. 
The Verification Protocol now under discussion to
strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC) includes three major elements,
all of which would be legally binding on signatory
nations: 
1. Annual declaration of dual-use facilities 
(those that could be used to develop phar-
maceuticals for either peaceful purposes or 
as weapons).
2. Challenge investigations, which would 
occur when a nation is accused of produc-
ing biological weapons and a certain 
percentage of nations that have signed the 
treaty agree that an inspection must be 
conducted.
3. Non-challenge visits, which would occur 
on a random basis to ensure BWC signa-
tory nations are complying with the treaty.
The Protocol also addresses matters of trade and
scientific cooperation, as well as offering measures
to promote compliance. These include: confiden-
tiality provisions, assistance and protection against
biological and toxin weapons, scientific and tech-
nological exchange for peaceful purposes and tech-
nical cooperation, confidence-building measures
and national implementation measures.
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But anyone who has followed the recent turmoil
associated with inspection of suspected chemical
weapons facilities, particularly those in Iraq, knows
how politically sensitive such inspections can be.
Since Iraq banned United Nations-sanctioned
chemical weapons inspectors from its soil, follow-
ing allegations that some inspectors were spying for
the United States, there’s been little political will to
engage in another round of weapons inspections of
any kind. 
Still, treaty officials have worked since the early
1990s to come up with a series of verification
measures that would be amenable to all parties.
However, regardless of what shape or flavor the
ultimate measures take, the key is in generating the
political will necessary to enact the Verification
Protocol. The ultimate success or failure of the bio-
logical weapons treaty depends greatly on whether
the nations that presently possess or have the capa-
bility to develop biological weapons believe that
the global threat of bio-warfare is greater than the
individual security interests of individual nations.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE.  Many voices will
have to be raised, and many government and phar-
maceutical industry leaders moved to action in
order to, first, create a set of verification measures
that will curtail the development of biological
weapons, and, second, provide the support neces-
sary for approval.
“There is a limited window of opportunity to
make an impact on the policy and policymaking
debate, and we believe the time to do it is now,
before threats become tragedies,” comments
Thomas Kean, former New Jersey governor and
chair of the Carnegie Corporation’s board of
trustees.
Kean’s concerns are echoed by Vartan Gregorian,
president of Carnegie Corporation.  He says, “The
goals of the 1972 biological weapons treaty have
not been attained, partially because there has been
too little attention paid to this lethal family of
weapons.  What’s critical now is not only to rein-
vigorate the [verification] protocol discussion but
to elevate the issues to the realm of public debate
so that everyone understands what is at stake
should these deadly weapons ever be used, either
by governments or terrorists.”
Gregorian continues: “Not only recent history but
examples drawn from conflicts stretching back into
time can show us how quickly humanity can be
overwhelmed by forces it wasn’t watching for.
Biological weapons are a force we must not only
watch for but vigilantly control, and that’s an obli-
gation that should be shared by government,
industry and any individual concerned with our
global future.”
Adds David Speedie, chair of the Corporation’s
International Peace and Security program, “The recent
standoff with Iraq over their suspected offensive biolog-
ical weapons capability indicated that the issue of bio-
logical weapons is a current and present danger.” 
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To help address these issues, the Corporation has
made a series of grants to organizations working
with governments and the pharmaceutical industry
to develop an effective Verification Protocol that
can be approved at the Fifth Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention Review Conference in 2001
and then later ratified by the nations involved.
Corporation grantees working on different aspects
of the treaty, including policy analysis and related
matters, include the University of Bradford,
Department of Peace Studies; the Harvard Sussex
Program; the Federation of American Scientists
Fund; and the Henry L. Stimson Center, Chemical
and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project. 
These organizations are not new to the battle
against the proliferation of biological weapons. But
as negotiations toward a Verification Protocol come
to a head in the next year or so, they are tasked
with one of their most important challenges. Their
goal is not necessarily only to get the nations of the
world to sign on the dotted line: it is to help craft
a series of measures that will make the world safer
then it is today. 
“It is simply a display of political will that is need-
ed to go the final distance, and the window of
opportunity for completion is indeed now,” writes
Graham Pearson, visiting professor of International
Security in the Department of Peace Studies at the
University of Bradford in the UK, in a June 2000
article in Arms Control Today, entitled, “The
Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention is
Within Reach.” 
Says Pearson, “Already, the protocol is showing
signs of being overelaborated and is becoming
unnecessarily detailed in some areas, thereby
removing flexibility from the future protocol
organization. If the negotiations are not completed
within the coming year, there is real danger that
the protocol’s provisions will become so corrupted
that the resulting regime will be ineffective and
inefficient and will fail to meet the objective of
strengthening the convention.”
“Never have the reasons for concluding the proto-
col been so acute,” he adds.  “Ultimately, the choice
is about the kind of world that we want to live in.
The wrong choice, or even the right choice made
too late, too grudgingly, could be devastating.”
WORKING THE PROBLEMS. Even though
proposed verification measures for the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention are virtually iden-
tical to those already approved under the Chemical
Weapons Convention, there are still numerous
roadblocks in the way of implementation. The
issues range from details about on-site visits and
inspections—such as length of advance notice,
access decisions, number of inspectors, approved
equipment and sampling and analysis—to the larg-
er issue of a disconnect between scientists/biolo-
gists and arms control experts. Members of the
security community know little biology, and those
with backgrounds in biology and medicine are
rarely interested in arms control.  The result is that
mutual ignorance and disinterest is causing a lack
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of concern in conducting the necessary negotia-
tions. And because each group has different expec-
tations and goals, negotiations can be somewhat
muddled because of difficulty in communicating
those desires. 
The question of declaring a pharmaceutical facility
as a suspected biological weapons production site
and then approving inspections of that facility also
raises the acrimonious question of haves versus
have-nots when both developed and undeveloped
countries can call for inspections.
“What conditions would require a state-party to
declare a certain facility or activity [to be suspect]?”
asks Pearson in his Arms Control Today article.
“The tension in this aspect is again between the
developed and developing countries. The devel-
oped countries are aiming for the triggers (to
declare an inspection) to strike the right balance so
that the most relevant facilities are declared in all
countries without placing a disproportionate bur-
den on themselves. The developing countries, how-
ever, want to see the burden placed primarily on
the developed countries, who have the most facili-
ties of concern to the treaty provisions, and there-
fore advocate triggers that would accomplish such a
result.”
And no matter how many safeguards are put in
place to protect intellectual property, there are
always going to be some in the pharmaceutical
industry who believe that proprietary information
will walk out the door with inspectors. This can
have significant economic consequences; estimates
are that it can cost a pharmaceutical company
$500 million to develop and market a drug and
double that for a vaccine.
“The pharmaceutical industry’s position is that
they support the treaty, protocol and declarations,
but don’t believe the value of visits (and inspec-
tions) is great enough to compensate for the nega-
tive aspects of them,” says Barbara Hatch
Rosenberg, chairperson of the Federation of
American Scientists (FAS) Working Group on
Biological Weapons Verification. “They are con-
cerned about their reputations and losing confiden-
tial information.”
That is exactly the official position of the main
pharmaceutical industry trade association, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA). “Since the nature of microbiol-
ogy is such that it is often easy to remove traces of
any development, manufacture or storage of a bio-
logical-warfare agent, any routine on-site activity is
not a useful concept under the Protocol,” states the
official PhRMA position on the BWC Verification
Protocol. 
The pharmaceutical industry does support what it
calls non-routine, non-random “familiarization”
visits as long as they are voluntary and completely
controlled by the company being inspected.
Industry executives agree that there are legitimate
reasons to conduct challenge inspections—such as
an unusual outbreak of disease or evidence of use
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of biological agents. However, PhRMA believes
that the rights of the biotech companies should
remain paramount. “Challenge inspections must
strike the proper balance between the need to clari-
fy a substantial claim of noncompliance on the one
hand and the legitimate rights of private industry
to protect its confidential business information,”
states the PhRMA position. “Therefore, strict man-
aged access must be employed and the inspected
site must have the final determination of what is
confidential or proprietary information.”  
It is that position, as well as reluctance among U.S.
government officials to bend the pharmaceutical
industry to the will of stronger weapons-of-mass-
destruction measures, that are most likely to derail
long-fought-for negotiations over the Verification
Protocol. 
“Now in their sixth year, the negotiations have
reached the endgame,” states an August 2000
report from the Federation of American Scientists
Working Group on the challenges that need to be
overcome in order to approve an effective
Verification Protocol, “with only the most impor-
tant and controversial issues awaiting solution: the
criteria for annual declaration of certain facilities
and programs; the question of random transparen-
cy visits to confirm the accuracy of declarations;
onsite measures for clarifying ambiguities or uncer-
tainties concerning declarations; and the require-
ments for launching a challenge investigation. But
in the last several years,” the report continues,
“progress has slowed almost to a halt. Prolonged
lack of leadership and unilateral demands by the
United States have inspired despair among our
allies in Geneva. The inability of the West to form
a solid front is a primary reason why the regime
likely to emerge from the negotiations, if any does
emerge, will be considerably weaker than it could
have been otherwise.”
Part of the reason for the long, drawn-out negotia-
tions toward a Verification Protocol could be a
misunderstanding about what the ultimate purpose
is, or should be. Says Rosenberg, “There is wide-
spread misconception that the purpose of a biolog-
ical weapons treaty compliance regime is to catch
violators red-handed. Given the difficulty of bio-
logical weapons verification because of the dual-use
problem, together with the political limitations on
the regime under negotiation, that is not likely.
Rather, the purpose is to raise, strengthen or
resolve suspicions, in response to which the state
parties can focus their intelligence capabilities
appropriately or take further action.”
All well and good, but many believe it is unlikely
that all political issues will be resolved in time for
the next treaty review conference, which, as noted
earlier, is scheduled to take place toward the end of
this year. 
As Tibor Toth, chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of
the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention writes in a recent article in
the widely respected CBW (Chemical & Biological
Weapons) Conventions Bulletin, “Complex techni-
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cal aspects still need to be refined, but the majority
of the decisions facing the [Ad Hoc Group] are
political in nature and thus require the most seri-
ous engagement of all parties in an active manner.”
For the organizations working on the treaty, those
words are most telling. According to most ob-
servers, Toth is saying that an effective Verification
Protocol doesn’t have a chance of being adopted if
politicians at the very highest levels in the U.S. and
elsewhere don’t become engaged in the process.
And to this point, they have not.
While the U.S. government officially endorses the
biological weapons treaty and proposed Verifi-
cation Protocol, many within the NGO communi-
ty are concerned that the support exists more in
theory than in practice.  There are, for example,
few senior-level people from the current U.S.
administration involved in the negotiations, and
it’s hard to predict the kind of emphasis that a new
administration will place on the treaty and on par-
ticipation in the verification process. The reticence
of the U.S. to support a strong regimen for inspec-
tions has done more than anything to muddy the
possibility of approving an effective Verification
Protocol, according to many.
“Except for the [Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention] ambassador himself, there is not a
single U.S. assistant or deputy secretary currently
involved in the process,” said Matthew Meselson,
co-director of the Harvard Sussex Program. “There
was much higher-level participation in the
Chemical Weapons Convention. It is because of a
failure on the part of the current U.S. government
administration to say this is of top-notch impor-
tance, and a failure of the secretary of state and
other secretaries to elevate this to a high level.”
In this respect, the U.S. is at odds with many other
developed nations—particularly those in Europe,
where senior government officials routinely take a
more active role in negotiations. Europe favors pro-
cedures that would make inspections of suspected
bio-weapon facilities more likely by letting them go
ahead unless a majority of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention’s Executive Council votes to
stop them. This is the so-called “red-light proce-
dure,” and is the way that inspections are conduct-
ed under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
The U.S. favors what is commonly called the
“green-light procedure,” under which inspections
only go forward if a majority of Executive Council
approves them. It is a subtle, but important differ-
ence that makes it easier to stop inspections and
harder to approve them. 
“The United States’ reluctance to support a strong
regime is surprising and worrying, as in the past it
has generally been a leader in developing strong
regimes to counter the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction,” states Graham Pearson of the
University of Bradford in his recent Arms Control
Today article. “This reluctance appears to parallel
the U.S. position on the Chemical Weapons
Convention(CWC). As a consequence of condi-
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tions in the Senate’s advice and consent to ratifica-
tion, the United States issued CWC implementing
legislation in 1998 that refused to allow samples
obtained during a challenge inspection to leave the
United States and granted the president the right
to veto a challenge inspection on national security
grounds. 
The lack of high-level support from the pharmaceu-
tical industry is also a disappointment for those sup-
porting strong inspection measures. Without the
support of the pharmaceutical industry, observers of
the biological weapons treaty believe there is little
chance that the U.S. Senate will ratify any
Verification Protocol. Most say that the U.S. Senate
would never have ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention in the early 1990s if not for the proac-
tive support of chemical industry executives. 
Some positive news for those supporting verifica-
tion measures for the biological weapons treaty
came in recent months when the Federation of
American Scientists and the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
issued a joint paper that came to some agreement
on means for protecting the pharmaceutical indus-
try’s trade secrets while still supporting an effective
treaty compliance regime. 
“PhRMA and the Federation of American
Scientists (FAS) have often been thought to stand
at opposite poles regarding verification measures
for the biological weapons treaty,” says FAS
Working Group chairperson Barbara Hatch
Rosenberg. “[However], the willingness of the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry to cooperate with the dec-
larations, non-challenge visits and investigations
that may be adopted under the protocol is now
clear, provided that the United States agrees to
include specific safeguards for industry in legisla-
tion to implement the protocol.” 
Both scientists and members of the pharmaceutical
industry have called on the U.S. government to
implement legislation that would address the
industry’s fears of possible loss of confidentiality
during on-site inspections. The hope is that such
legislation would be enough to convince senior
executives in the pharmaceutical industry to sup-
port the biological weapons treaty and, maybe
more importantly, persuade the federal government
to take a higher level, strategic view of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
Finally, failure to settle on a suitable Verification
Protocol in the near future will also do significant
damage to another key aspect of the biological
weapons treaty, the provisions for strengthening
scientific and educational cooperation between
developed and non-developed nations. These
include scientific cooperation for preventing infec-
tious diseases such as AIDS, promoting economic
competitiveness within the worldwide pharmaceu-
tical industry, and the transfer of medical knowl-
edge from developed to under-developed nations. 
On the eve of World War I, Andrew Carnegie,
11
who had devoted the last years of his life to inter-
national efforts to bring about peace, declared that
while it was always necessary “to keep a vigilant eye
upon events,” it was also the duty of men of good
will to work toward “the education of the public
for peace, to spread arbitral justice among nations
and to promote the comity and commerce of the
world without the dangers of war.”  The current
issues and opportunities surrounding the potential
of nations to use biological weapons—or to put
them away forever—provides us with the opportu-
nity to heed both of Carnegie’s exhortations: to be
vigilant, yes, but also to always work towards end-
ing threats to international stability.  Mindful of its
founder’s mandate, Carnegie Corporation of New
York invites continued debate and discussion about
ways to control biological weapons; as the Corpor-
ation’s president, Vartan Gregorian has written in
regard to cooperative international engagement on
difficult issues:  “The stakes are high, the risks are
great, but the opportunities are immensely exciting
and the outcome potentially groundbreaking.”   
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APPENDIX
HISTORY OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND 
TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION
It has become clear over the last century—since it
was demonstrated that specific microorganisms
cause diseases in humans, animals and plants—that
a series of major countries have established signifi-
cant biological weapons programs. 
While the Japanese used biological weapons on a
large scale in China before and during World War
II, it was the British and Americans who demon-
strated that the most effective means of using such
weapons was by generating an aerosol and infecting
human beings via their lungs. Used in this way, in
certain circumstances, some pathogens can have
equivalent or greater lethality than nuclear
weapons. 
The U.S. closed down its own biological weapons
program at the end of the 1960s, and helped spear-
head the adoption of the  Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC), which was approved
in 1972 and went into force three years later. 
The BWC prohibits the possession, development
and stockpiling of biological weapons, but lacks
verification measures like inspections of facilities
suspected of manufacturing biological weapons and
toxins. That may not have seemed like an impor-
tant oversight in 1972 when few had the scientific
and technological know-how to develop such
weapons, but that loophole has become increasing-
ly widened over the past three decades.
When the treaty was negotiated in the early 1970s,
many countries considered biological weapons to
have little military utility. By the mid-1970s that
had suddenly changed with the dawn of genetic
engineering—which brought the promise (and
threat) of new technologies and capabilities to
manufacture heretofore unknown and unseen
viruses and toxins. 
Despite the Soviet Union being a Depository State
for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,
meaning it signed the treaty and promised to abide
by its declarations, it proceeded on a vast expan-
sion of its own offensive biological weapons pro-
gram. The Soviets produced very contagious agents
like plague and smallpox and then developed
means to deliver those diseases to the battlefield
with rockets and bombs.
In 1979 there was an anthrax outbreak in
Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union, which is now known to
have resulted from an accident at a Soviet biologi-
cal weapons facility. This coincided with the first
review conference of the biological weapons treaty,
where the treaty nations reaffirmed “their determi-
nation to act with a view to achieving effective
progress towards general and complete disarma-
ment including the prohibition and elimination of
all types of weapons of mass destruction [and] the
prohibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biolog-
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ical) weapons and their elimination, [ in order to
achieve] general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.”
The opportunity represented by the era of Russian
“glasnost,” as well as increasing suspicions and alle-
gations that a few signatories were violating the
treaty, led the signatory nations to agree to a sec-
ond Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
review conference in 1986. That resulted in a series
of confidence-building measures such as annual
information exchanges between the U.S. and
USSR.
When these confidence-building measures
appeared inadequate, international concern provid-
ed impetus for enhancing global security by negoti-
ating a legally binding regime to strengthen the
effectiveness of the BWC.
The third review in 1991 resulted in the establish-
ment of a committee of verification experts, com-
monly known as the VEREX Committee, who
were charged with developing a series of legally
binding verification measures for the BWC. The
necessity of doing so became clear in 1992 when
the Soviet Union admitted to its large-scale bio-
weapons program. It was also around that time
that the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) appointed to investigate Iraq’s sus-
pected chemical weapons program found evidence
of just such a program after the Persian Gulf war,
the Japanese terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo released a
deadly biological agent into Tokyo’s subway system,
and evidence surfaced of a significant South
African biological weapons development program
during the white-rule era. 
The VEREX report was presented at a Special
Conference in 1994, leading to the establishment
of a committee—the Ad Hoc Group of the States
Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention—whose job it is to develop and nego-
tiate a series of enforcement measures to strengthen
the treaty.  Those enforcement measures are typi-
cally referred to as the Verification Protocol. 
Its purpose is clear: to prevent the revolutionary
discoveries of biotechnology from being used to
fuel a massive, new arms race.  That, combined
with better surveillance and intelligence, as well as
stronger and more effective export controls may be
able to provide the “web of deterrence” needed to
reverse this dangerous trend. 
Presently, the countries suspected of having biolog-
ical weapons programs include: the U.S., Russia,
China, Taiwan, North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Egypt,
Iran, Cuba, Israel and Japan.
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